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Abstract 
Policy makers worldwide are interested in the identification of cost-effective policy instruments 
to reduce diffuse pollution. A large economic model representing heterogeneous farms is used to 
evaluate a broad set of policies for reducing nitrate regulation within a large catchment 
dominated by dairy production. A policy instrument that allows the level of abatement to vary 
among producers according to differences in abatement cost is most cost-effective. The primary 
goal of 26 kg N ha-1 can be achieved at a cost of $15 ha-1 under this cap and trade policy, while a 
uniform cap on emissions for all farmers would be more than three times as expensive ($49 ha-1). 
In contrast, requiring uniform reductions in stocking rate, banning the application of nitrogen 
fertiliser, and land retirement perform poorly. These instruments are at least three times more 
costly than a cap and trade policy over all simulated reductions. Moreover, the differentiated 
policy does not greatly alter the distribution of farm profit, relative to what exists without 
regulation. The use of a large, complex economic model incorporating disaggregated farms 
provides unique insight into the economic benefits accruing to a differentiated policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The quality of many freshwater resources throughout the world is decreasing because of diffuse 
pollution from pastoral agriculture (Campbell et al., 2005; Drewry et al., 2006). Indeed, diffuse 
sources are now the primary polluters of water ways worldwide, as effective regulation is 
difficult given the unobservability of pollutant loads and the multiple agents typically responsible 
(UNEP, 2008). Dairy production is the primary export industry in New Zealand, but urine 
deposition by grazing cows across 1.5 million ha of temperate grassland incurs leaching losses of 
nitrogen (N) well in excess of those that can be sustained by freshwater ecosystems (Monaghan 
et al., 2007). This is similar to Australia, where N losses under dairy production are much greater 
than those of other forms of pastoral agriculture (Drewry et al., 2006). Much reliance has been 
placed on voluntary mechanisms to promote abatement among New Zealand dairy producers, 
such as the Clean Streams Accord 2003. However, there is growing evidence that these measures 
are too weak to achieve the level of abatement required to achieve nutrient reductions 
commensurate with the value of environmental assets to society (Doole and Paragahawewa, 
2010; Bewsell and Brown, 2011), consistent with Australian evidence (e.g. Cary and Roberts, 
2011).  
 The inability of voluntary mechanisms to achieve environmental goals has stimulated the 
analysis of various regulatory policies to reduce diffuse pollution from New Zealand dairy farms. 
Ramilan et al. (2010) found, using a deterministic model, that standards (legislated decreases in 
pollution level) are more cost-effective than taxes applied to nitrate emissions. However, this 
finding contradicts established theory that shows that both instruments have identical impacts in 
a deterministic setting (Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Hanley et al., 2007). Moreover, this study did 
not include the presence of discrete mitigation practices, such as feed pads, and ignored farm 
heterogeneity through the analysis of representative farms. Doole (2010) demonstrated that 
failing to represent farm heterogeneity can restrict insight into the relative value of alternate 
instruments. Indeed, using a model providing a detailed description of individual farms, policies 
targeted at restricting polluting inputs (cows and nitrogen fertiliser) were shown to be more cost-
effective when each regulated farm could reduce their use by different amounts under a cap and 
trade (i.e. differentiated) policy. However, the type of instruments and mitigation practices 
evaluated were very limited and only a small collection of farms was investigated. 
 There has as yet been no analysis of the broad set of policies that environmental regulators 
have considered for the regulation of dairy production in New Zealand, yet alone one that 
considers inter-farm heterogeneity. The objective of this analysis is to overcome this deficiency 
through the identification of the cost-effectiveness of a broad range of policies for reducing 
nitrate leaching from dairy production in a catchment in the Waikato region of New Zealand.   
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 The Waikato area is the primary dairy farming region of New Zealand and recent evidence 
confirms that water quality within the Waikato River, the primary water way in this region, is 
declining due to intensive dairy production within its catchment (Semadini-Davies et al., 2008). 
The set of scenarios evaluated in this study is formulated through consultation with the local 
regulatory agency (Environment Waikato) charged with achieving the sustainable management 
of natural resources, including water quality, through the Resource Management Act 1991. This 
study appears to be the first to evaluate a broad set of realistic policy instruments using an 
economic model that describes a large population of individual agents at a comprehensive level 
of detail, calibrated to real data, and allows them to respond optimally to simulated incentives. 
This approach is favourable given the complexity of agricultural systems and the many 
strategies, most of which are interdependent, that affect both farm profit and pollutant load. The 
large model consists of over two million equations and describes management across 332 
individual agents.  
 The analysis indicates that representing inter-firm heterogeneity is valuable since abatement 
cost can be reduced through the trading of pollution entitlements among farmers who possess 
different costs of abatement. Moreover, this instrument is demonstrated to have little implication 
for the distribution of farm income across the sample population. These findings emphasise the 
importance of representing individual agents in models used for policy evaluation and the 
benefits of implementing regulatory instruments that consider the differences in the cost of 
abatement across producers. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the model and the 
policy scenarios. Section 3 presents results and discussion. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Policy Model 
2.1 Policy Scenarios 
The model simulates part of the Waikato River catchment in the North Island of New Zealand. 
The analysis is restricted to optimal regulation of dairy farming since this land use dominates this 
catchment in terms of land allocation and nitrate emissions. Moreover, understanding how farm 
heterogeneity impacts the optimal regulation of dairy farming is important given the national 
significance of this industry and current uncertainty regarding the cost-effectiveness of alternate 
policies. However, the inclusion of additional land uses is the subject of ongoing research. 
 The catchment model incorporates 332 individual farms with a total area of 41,205 ha; 
123,885 cows; and annual production in 2008/09 of around 40,225 tonnes of milk solids. The 
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individual farm models are calibrated to real farm-specific data to ensure simulation of actual 
conditions in the catchment, both in terms of average and total values, and in the distribution of 
these values across farms.  
 Six policy instruments were identified through discussion with policy makers and evaluation 
of the relevant literature (Table 1). In each case, the policy was applied to the catchment model 
to simulate reduction in nitrogen leaching to the target level of 26 kg N ha-1 and to alternate 
levels of 22 and 30 kg N ha-1. The latter two goals represent deviations from the target level to 
demonstrate how different targets affect farm management and profitability.  
 
Table 1. Details of policy instruments evaluated in the model 
 
 Policy Description 
1. Uniform cap on stocking rates  Every dairy farm in the catchment must limit stocking rates 
to a specified level  
2. Ban N fertiliser, 1 Mar–31 July Dairy farms are prohibited from applying N fertiliser 
between 1 March and 31 July  
3. Ban N fertiliser application Dairy farms are prohibited from applying N fertiliser at any 
time 
4. Uniform cap on nitrogen emissions Every dairy farm in the catchment must limit average N 
emissions to 22, 26, or 30 kg N ha-1 or less 
5. Cap on nitrogen emissions, trading 
allowed 
Total N emissions across the catchment equal 22, 26, or 30 
kg N ha-1, but abatement varies over farms depending on 
farm characteristics 
6. Replace dairy with sheep and beef 
farms 
Specific farms are selected for conversion out of dairying to 
achieve emission targets at least cost 
 
 The individual farm models described in Section 2.3 are used to evaluate the first four 
policies. These individual models are coupled to identify the impacts of trading leaching 
entitlements in the fifth scenario. Optimal land retirement (policy 6) is determined through the 
use of output from the dairy farm models in a separate optimisation framework (Section 2.5). 
2.2 Relative Efficiency of Differentiated and Uniform Instruments 
A key focus of this analysis is policy instruments that allow the trading of pollution entitlements 
(Table 1). It is useful to review the basic arguments for their superiority over uniform 
instruments here (Hanley et al., 2007), given the importance of differentiated policies in this 
study (Section 3.2).  
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 Assume the catchment consists of two farms. Figure 1 delineates two marginal abatement 
cost curves: 1MAC  and 2MAC  for farm 1 and 2, respectively. Abatement cost increases in each 
firm as greater mitigation is performed. Denote the unregulated pollution level as 1N  and 2N  for 
each farm (Figure 1). Suppose the target level of pollutant is reduced below baseline levels and 
tradable permits are introduced that give farms the right to leach a given amount of nitrate. Then, 
optimal pollution intensity will reduce to *N  where 21 MACMAC = , shown in Figure 1 as the 
intersection of both curves. The loss of profit associated with the policy is the sum of lost profit 
for farm 1 (area A) and farm 2 (area B).  
Figure 1. Abatement cost in a two-farm catchment with the implementation of trading for pollution 
entitlements.  
 
Notes: MAC denotes the marginal abatement cost curve for each farm. A = Loss of profit for farm 1 with 
trade. B = Loss of profit for farm 2 with trade. U denotes a hypothetical allocation of abatement between 
both farms with a uniform policy targeted at N emissions. 
  
 Instead, suppose a uniform policy (U) was introduced that requires each farm to leach a 
given amount of N or below (e.g. 26 kg N ha-1). Except under exceptional circumstances, each 
farm would undergo a different amount of abatement than what would occur under *N . For 
example, with policy U in Figure 1, farm 2 would perform much more abatement than farm 1, 
incurring a much higher cost. This disequilibrium position demonstrates how total abatement 
cost may be reduced through increasing the abatement that farm 1 performs and decreasing that 
which farm 2 performs until 21 MACMAC = . This shows how a differentiated instrument can 
lower total abatement cost through allowing the trading of pollution entitlements. 
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2.3  Model Structure 
This section provides a brief description of the Doole (2010) model, which is extended in this 
analysis to incorporate a greater number of currently recommended management practices 
(CRMPs) and farms. Further detail is presented in Doole (2010) and the Appendix. A complex 
description of each individual farm is provided in the model since this gives a more accurate 
description of the mitigation strategies available to producers. For example, if a feed pad is 
adopted, this will impact feed management across the year in this model, but would not be 
considered in less-sophisticated frameworks. 
 Each year is divided into 26 fortnightly feed periods to provide detailed insight into temporal 
feed allocation. Cows consume grazed pasture and supplementary feeds, namely concentrates, 
grass silage, and maize silage. Farm area in each period is grazed, harvested for grass silage, or 
spelled. Grazing or silage production can only occur between pasture biomass thresholds that 
ensure the maintenance of seasonal feed quality and maximise opportunities for subsequent 
regrowth. Moreover, silage can only be produced at certain times of the year when pasture 
supply is excess to livestock requirements. Nitrogen fertiliser application increases pasture 
biomass in subsequent periods. Yield responses and the lag between application and improved 
growth depend on the time of fertiliser application.  
 Metabolisable energy (ME) is that available for livestock growth and maintenance after the 
digestion of feed. The supply of ME for allocation between livestock classes is the sum of all 
feed sources available in a given period. The five sources are: land allocation to grazing, grass 
silage produced in previous periods, additional pasture growth from nitrogen fertiliser 
application, and purchased supplements (concentrates and maize silage). Feed pools are allocated 
between livestock classes, each of which requires a given level of ME in each period. There are 
216 different cow herds, each with different temporal energy demands given disparity in calving 
date, herd status (cull versus standard), lactation length, and productivity. Feed intake constraints 
ensure that cows do not consume unrealistic amounts of energy.  
 Total nitrate load from a given farm is defined as a function of nitrogen fertiliser application, 
livestock intensity, milk production, and maize silage consumption. Nitrate loads can be reduced 
through changes in production management or through the adoption of CRMPs. Changes in 
management are the options of feeding low protein feed or reducing nitrogen fertiliser 
application, stocking rate, or per-cow milk production. CRMPS are low-rate effluent application, 
improved dairy shed management of effluent, deferred effluent application, use of a feed pad, or 
application of nitrification inhibitors. Low-N feed reduces N excretion by livestock. Low-rate 
effluent application means less N is lost to leaching since it is applied more in line with plant 
requirements. Improved dairy shed management of effluent involves the use of automated yard 
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cleaning to reduce the effort of effluent collection at milking and reduce effluent volume. 
Leaching can be reduced by deferring effluent application until drier periods. A feed pad reduces 
leaching by removing cows from pasture during periods of high leaching risk. Nitrification 
inhibitors reduce N leaching by preventing the conversion of ammonium to nitrate during the 
process of nitrification.   
 It is assumed that each farmer aims to maximise farm profit. Total revenue is earned from 
the sale of milk, culled cows, and excess calves. Total cost is the sum of general variable costs 
incurred for each cow, fixed costs incurred per hectare of farm area, cost of silage production, 
cost of maize silage, cost of concentrates, and cost of nitrogen fertiliser.  
 Each farm model is calibrated to micro-level data from a variety of sources. Variables that 
drive important sources of heterogeneity in farming systems that are represented in this analysis 
are farm size, distance from the waterway, milk production per cow, soil mix, and stocking rate. 
This data is drawn from AsureQuality, DairyNZ, Livestock Improvement Corporation, and New 
Zealand Land Resources Inventory information. Each farm model involves fixed farm size, 
distance from the waterway, and soil types. Each model is also calibrated to report their actual 
stocking rate and milk production for the 2008/09 milking season. The use of constraints in the 
optimisation models to achieve calibration reduces their ability to change from the observed 
situation, in response to the simulation of alternative policies. Accordingly, positive 
mathematical programming (Doole, 2010) is adopted to ensure the representation of historical 
relationships, but without loss of flexibility.  
 The trading of leaching entitlements is represented through the coupling of the individual 
farm models. These are joined through the addition of the constraint ∑=
j
jNN , where N  is an 
aggregate emissions target and jN  is total emissions from firm j. An Augmented Lagrangian 
procedure (Conejo et al., 2006) is employed, which involves appending the coupling constraint 
to the profit function of each farm model through the use of a shadow price and a quadratic 
penalty function. Every farm model is then solved in each iteration. The shadow price for the 
coupling constraint is updated in each iteration until the coupling constraint is satisfied optimally 
(Doole, 2010).  
 All models are solved using nonlinear programming in the CONOPT3 solver in GAMS 
Distribution 23 (Brooke et al. 2008). Each farm model contains 6,540 constraints and 4,600 
decision variables. Thus, the full catchment model contains around 2 million constraints and 1.5 
million decision variables. 
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2.4 Parameter values 
Parameters from the 2008/09 milking season are used. All monetary values are stated in 2008/09 
New Zealand dollars.  N fertiliser responses and minimum, maximum, and residual pasture 
masses are taken from McCall et al. (1999). Feed energy, substitution, and utilisation rates are 
taken from McCall et al. (1999) and Dexcel (2008a). Average pasture production is taken from 
Dexcel (2008b).  Energy demand for each cow attribute combination as a function of grazing, 
milk production, and pregnancy is computed using a simulation model constructed using 
information from Dexcel (2008a).  
Leachate burdens are calculated for different soil types using numerous combinations of maize 
silage amounts, milk production, N fertiliser use, and stocking rate using the OVERSEER model 
(Monaghan et al., 2007). The metamodel is generated through linear regression of this data using 
SHAZAM econometric software (Whistler et al., 2004). The efficacy of mitigations are taken as 
the midpoint from ranges computed in the BMP toolbox (Monaghan, 2009).  
The milk price for 2008/09 ($5140 t-1 MS) is taken from LIC (2009). Production costs are drawn 
from AgFirst Waikato (2009), Chaston (2008), DairyNZ (2009), and Longhurst and Smeaton 
(2008). The costs of the mitigations are taken from AgFirst Waikato (2009), Longhurst and 
Smeaton (2008), and Monaghan (2009).  
2.5 Land Retirement Model 
The model described in Section 2.1 is unsuitable for the investigation of optimal land retirement. 
A separate model is therefore developed: 
∑∑
=Ω
ΩΩ
=Ω
ΩΩΩ −+=
332
1
332
1
)1(max aRRaS sππ , (1) 
subject to: 
∑∑
=Ω
ΩΩ
=Ω
ΩΩΩ −+≥
332
1
332
1
)1( aNRRaNN s , and (2) 
}1,0{=ΩR , (3) 
where S is total profit in the catchment, Ω  is an index of farm number, Ωπ  is the profit for a 
given farm, Ωa  is the size of a given farm, ΩR  is an indicator variable showing whether a farm 
is retained in dairy production ( 1=ΩR ) or retired and used as a sheep and beef farm ( 0=ΩR ), 
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sπ  is the profit for an average sheep and beef farm in the study period and region, N  is the 
emissions target, ΩN  is the nitrate emissions of a given farm, and sN  is the nitrate emissions 
of an average sheep and beef farm in the study period and region. 
Ωπ , Ωa , and ΩN  are taken from the individual dairy farm models described in Section 2.3. 
15=sN  is an estimate of leaching under an average sheep and beef farm in the district. 
222$=sπ  is the profit per hectare for a Waikato sheep and beef farm in 2008/09 (MAF, 
2009).  The model described in eqs. 1–3 is solved using integer programming in the COIN 
GLPK solver in GAMS Distribution 23. 
 
3.  Results and Discussion 
 
3.1 Baseline Farm Data 
Farm-level statistics from the simulation model are presented in this section and compared with 
actual data from various sources. Histograms showing model outputs for milk production, cow 
numbers, and N fertiliser application levels are presented in Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2.  Probability distributions of milk production, cow number, and nitrogen fertiliser use per 
hectare and per farm 
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 Milk production defined both per hectare and per farm is highly variable. Average milk 
production is 4 per cent below the reported mean of 327 kg MS cow-1 for the Waikato region in 
2008/09 (LIC, 2009). The number of cows per hectare and per farm is also highly variable. 
These variables are approximately normally distributed, with an average stocking rate 1.3 per 
cent below the reported mean of 3.02 cows ha-1 for the Waikato region in 2008/09 (LIC, 2009). 
The modelled distribution for nitrogen fertiliser has a strong peak at 150–175 kg ha-1, and 
includes some higher levels of application, up to 375 kg ha-1. The modelled distribution is 
representative in that the mean is only 4 per cent above the mean (166 kg ha-1) reported for the 
Waikato region in 2008 (EW, 2008). 
 Model outputs for farm profit and nitrate leaching are shown in Figure 3. High rates of 
leaching have been reported for some farms in this region (e.g. AgFirst Waikato, 2009), 
consistent with the higher values shown here. This is balanced by a number of farms with lower 
rates of leaching, especially those on podzol soils. Hence, average nitrate leaching is almost 
equal to the national mean reported by Basset-Mens et al. (2009). Overall, output of the 
catchment model is broadly representative of industry statistics, thus supporting its use for policy 
evaluation.  
 
Figure 3. Probability distributions of farm profit and nitrate leaching per hectare and per farm 
3.2 Abatement costs for each policy instrument 
The abatement cost of each policy per hectare with and without CRMPs is presented in Table 2. 
The most cost-effective policy instrument across all nutrient targets is a tradable-permit system 
targeted at nitrate emissions. For example, with CRMPs, the tradable-permit instrument achieves 
the 26 kg N ha-1 goal for the catchment at a cost of $14.79 ha-1, which is 70 per cent less than the 
$49.47 cost of a uniform policy where every farm must restrict average emissions to 26 kg N ha-1 
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or less (Table 2). This result indicates that there is wide variation in the slope of abatement costs 
across producers, in accordance with the substantial heterogeneity evident in Figure 3. It also 
reinforces the suitability of the approach taken to representing farm-level heterogeneity in the 
model.  
 The importance of policy-instrument selection is further demonstrated by the very wide 
range of policy costs reported in Table 2. A uniform cap on stocking rate and land retirement 
would cost $123.47 ha-1 and $154.77 ha-1, respectively, to achieve a goal of 26 kg N ha-1; more 
than eight times the cost of a differentiated policy targeted at N emissions. The most expensive 
instrument at this target level of leaching is a complete ban on nitrogen fertiliser, which would 
cost $193.93 ha-1.  
Table 2. Abatement cost for all simulated policies expressed per hectare 
Policy No CRMPs1 CRMPs 
 Cost per hectare ($ ha-1) Cost per hectare ($ ha-1) 
 22 kg N ha-1 
1.  Cap cow no.  295.53 295.53 
2.  Ban N fert. 193.93 193.93 
4.  Cap emissions (no trade) 204.54 96.6 
5.  Cap emissions (trade) 115.83 54.39 
6.  Land retirement 404.91 404.91 
   
 26 kg N ha-1 
1.  Cap cow no.  123.47 123.47 
2.  Ban N fert. 193.93 193.93 
4.  Cap emissions (no trade) 102.85 49.47 
5.  Cap emissions (trade) 35.78 14.79 
6.  Land retirement 154.77 154.77 
 30 kg N ha-1 
1.  Cap cow no.  5.84 5.84 
2.  Ban N fert. 193.93 193.93 
4.  Cap emissions (no trade) 50.79 22.9 
5.  Cap emissions (trade) 1.07 0.69 
6.  Land retirement 41.06 41.06 
 
Notes: A complete ban on N fertiliser application achieves all goals at a cost of $21.08. A ban on N 
fertiliser application from 1 March to 31 July is ineffective at achieving any goal. 
1 CRMP = Currently Recommended Mitigation Practices. 
 The use of CRMPs, such as improved effluent management and the construction and use of 
feed pads, greatly reduces mitigation costs for both a uniform cap and a cap and trade policy 
targeted at N emissions. For example, with the 26 kg N ha-1 goal, the cost of a uniform cap on 
emissions would fall from $102.85 ha-1 to $49.47 ha-1 with the use of CRMPs, while the cost 
with cap and trade would fall from $35.78 ha-1 to $14.79 ha-1 with CRMPs. This emphasises the 
importance of including CRMPs in the analysis of alternative policies. Moreover, it highlights 
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the value of economic modeling for estimating the optimal response of producers, given the 
interdependency between many of the factors that determine profit and pollution in the model.  
 Reducing nitrogen fertiliser application is a key mitigation used by producers to satisfy the 
nutrient leaching goals specified in the simulation model. Indeed, imposing a total ban on 
nitrogen fertiliser application across the catchment exactly achieves the goal of 22 kg N ha-1. 
However, the total ban also reduces income substantially (Table 2), as the marginal value of the 
additional feed provided by its application is significant. In contrast, prohibiting nitrogen 
fertiliser application between 1 March and 31 July has no impact on either leaching or profit in 
this model. This is intuitive given that the benefit of such applications is low since cows are 
ending lactation and responses to N application are variable at this time. 
 Land retirement is the most-expensive form of regulation when the ban on N fertiliser 
application is not considered. Land retirement involves the replacement of selected dairy farms 
with an average sheep and beef farm (Section 2.5) to achieve nutrient reductions. It is a costly 
policy across all nutrient goals (Table 2) since the different rates at which abatement costs 
increase as greater mitigation is performed across farms is not accounted for in instrument 
design, converse to a differentiated instrument. Rather, one land use changes to a much less-
profitable type of agriculture and farmers bear a significant opportunity cost.  
 The 22, 26, and 30 kg N ha-1 goals can be achieved by imposing stocking rate caps of 2.25, 
2.65 and 3.5 cows ha-1, respectively, across all farms in the catchment. These caps achieve large 
reductions in leaching load, as stocking rate is a key driver of nutrient losses in New Zealand 
dairy farming systems given the high N content of urine patches (Monaghan et al., 2007). 
However, though effective, this policy has a high opportunity cost since stocking rate is a key 
determinant of farm profit and the focus of the regulatory instrument on stocking rate does not 
allow producers to use CRMPs to offset the requirements of policy, converse to those policies 
aimed at reducing emissions levels directly.  
 One possibility is that pollution could increase with the implementation of a maximum 
stocking rate across the catchment, as producers may increase inputs to maximise the value they 
obtain from a herd of a fixed size (input enhancement). For example, the application of nitrogen 
fertiliser could increase to lift milk production within a herd in which livestock numbers are 
fixed, increasing the overall amount of N lost from the system. The model takes this into account 
through the identification of a stocking rate consistent with achieving a given nutrient goal under 
profit maximization (Section 2.1). Nonetheless, if stocking rate limits are determined 
exogenously to a decision model, input enhancement must be considered. Doole (2010) showed 
that input enhancement is not optimal in one setting, given the flatness of marginal profit curves 
for key inputs (Doole, 2010).  
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 Cost differences between uniform cap and cap and trade policies are further explored in 
Figures 3a and 3b. Under a uniform policy, there is an approximate, straight line relationship 
between base leaching load and the required level of abatement on farms where mitigation is 
required (Figure 4a). (The number of zero levels reported for abatement for a uniform policy in 
Figure 4a is for farms that emit less than 26 kg N ha-1 in the absence of regulation.) In 
comparison, the proportion of base leaching load that is mitigated on individual farms varies 
under cap and trade (Figure 4a). On average, with a cap and trade instrument, farmers with 
higher baseline loads do less abatement than would occur under a uniform policy and farmers 
with lower baseline loads do more abatement than would occur with a uniform policy (Figure 
4a). Thus, abatement costs under a cap and trade instrument increase for farms with lower 
emissions and decrease for farms with higher emissions, relative to a uniform policy (Figure 4b). 
 
 
Figure 4. (a) Absolute level of abatement and (b) the cost of performing this abatement for all farms 
for uniform and cap and trade policies set to achieve 26 kg N-1 across the catchment 
3.3 Adoption of mitigation practices 
In this section, the effect of a reduction of leaching to 26 kg N ha-1 on farms with different 
stocking rates and emissions levels is examined. Model outputs for three dissimilar farms on 
volcanic soils are presented in Table 3. Nitrate leaching increases with stocking rate and nitrogen 
fertiliser application (Table 3). No mitigations are used on any farms without regulation since 
their use is costly. Indeed, none of the CRMPs are profitable in the absence of regulation, so the 
model predicts that broad scale voluntary adoption is unlikely to occur, in line with recent 
research (e.g. Bewsell and Brown, 2011). 
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Table 3. Key model output for low, medium, and high emissions farms without regulation and with 
uniform and differentiated policies set at 26 kg N ha-1 
Policy Low-emissions 
farm 
Medium- 
emissions  
farm 
High- 
emissions  
farm 
 Without regulation 
Stocking rate (cows ha-1) 1.8 3.2 4.3 
Nitrogen fertiliser (kg ha-1) 95 186 377 
Nitrate leaching (kg N ha-1) 18.3 34.8 51.5 
Profit ($ ha-1) 656 1944 2704 
CRMPs None None None 
  
Uniform regulation targeted at leaching load 
Stocking rate (cows ha-1) 1.8 3.0 3.8 
Nitrogen fertiliser (kg ha-1) 95 122 131 
Nitrate leaching (kg N ha-1) 18.3 26 26 
Profit ($ ha-1) 656 1896 2338 
CRMPs None Improved dairy shed 
management of effluent 
Deferred effluent 
application 
Improved dairy shed 
management of effluent 
Deferred effluent 
application 
Nitrification inhibitors 
  
Cap and trade regulation targeted at leaching load 
Stocking rate (cows ha-1) 1.8 3.1 4.2 
Nitrogen fertiliser (kg ha-1) 89 162 324 
Nitrate leaching (kg N ha-1) 16.8 27.9 40.9 
Profit ($ ha-1) 654 1919 2672 
CRMPs Improved dairy 
shed 
management of 
effluent 
Deferred 
effluent 
application 
Improved dairy shed 
management of effluent 
Deferred effluent 
application 
Improved dairy shed 
management of effluent 
Deferred effluent 
application 
  
 A uniform regulation of 26 kg N ha-1 does not affect the management of the low-emissions 
farm since it leaches less than this under current practices. However, both the medium- and high-
emissions farms must reduce leaching to meet the policy goal. Both farms reduce pollutant level 
through reducing stocking rate and nitrogen fertiliser application. Under a uniform regulation, 
CRMPs are used to meet the nutrient goal at lower cost. Effluent management is improved on 
both the medium- and high-emissions farms and nitrification inhibitors are applied on the high-
emissions farm to reduce leaching due to nitrification and increase pasture production (Table 3). 
This costs the medium- and high-emissions farms around $48 and $366 ha-1, respectively. This 
result reinforces the fact that high-emissions farms bear a higher cost under a uniform policy, as 
displayed in Figure 4b. 
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 In comparison, all farms are responsible for mitigation across the catchment under a cap and 
trade policy (Table 3). This is achieved through reductions in stocking rate and nitrogen fertiliser 
application and the adoption of improved effluent management on each farm. The overall result 
is the achievement of a low abatement cost on all farms, with profit falling by less than 1.3 per 
cent across the population. Indeed, profit on each farm decreases by only $2, $25, and $32 ha-1 
on the low-, medium-, and high-emissions farms, respectively. These results reinforce the 
economic benefits of a cap and trade policy brought about by the significant differences between 
the abatement characteristics of farms in the catchment.  
3.4  Distributional Effects of Policy 
A policy can impact on the distribution of profit among a regulated population. This is important 
to consider since some firms could be substantially worse off after the introduction of a given 
regulation. This is explored using cumulative distribution functions. The length of a cumulative 
distribution function for farm profit indicates the variability of profit, while its location indicates 
what levels of profit are earned with this policy.  
Figure 5. Cumulative distribution functions for farm profit ($ ha-1) in the base scenario (Base), with 
a differentiated emissions standard (Diff. N), and with a uniform cow reduction (Un. cow) set to 
achieve a catchment-wide goal of (a) 30 kg N ha-1, (b) 26 kg N ha-1, and (c) 22 kg N ha-1.  
Notes: Results for a uniform N reduction are not shown since these are very similar to those for the 
differentiated policy. Results for land retirement are not considered given the high cost of this policy, 
relative to the other instruments. 
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 The policies have a similar impact on the distribution of farm profit for leaching limits of 30 
kg N ha-1 (Figure 5a) and 26 kg N ha-1 (Figure 5b). However, the distributional effects of 
regulatory policy are more disparate with a nutrient goal of 22 kg N ha-1 (Figure 5c). The base 
scenario has the highest level of profit, but also the greatest variability. A differentiated 
instrument has a low expected impact on profit and its distribution, particularly compared to the 
base scenario. This emphasises that the use of a cap and trade policy over all nutrient reductions 
is beneficial for the regulation of diffuse pollution in this catchment, as it has minimal impact on 
the distribution of income among producers. Nonetheless, the uniform cow reduction decreases 
profit significantly, especially compared to all other scenarios shown in Figure 5.  
4.  Summary 
Diffuse pollution from pastoral agriculture threatens water quality throughout the world. Like 
many nations, New Zealand faces a difficult balancing act between protection of freshwater 
resources and the profitability of an economically and politically important agricultural industry. 
Dairy farms are a major contributor to nitrate leaching and will have to modify current practices 
to reverse this trend. However, producers and policy makers are concerned with the costs of 
achieving higher environmental standards, which are uncertain and potentially significant. Thus, 
the identification of cost-effective policy instruments for the regulation of N leaching from New 
Zealand dairy farms is of vital importance. 
 This analysis explores the cost and distributional impacts of a broad set of regulatory 
instruments on a large population of dairy farms in the Waikato region of New Zealand. It 
explicitly deals with heterogeneity between agents through modelling individual farms in 
significant detail and calibrating these models to real data. This approach provides novel insight 
into the impacts of policies that require individual farms to undergo certain changes or allow 
those farms who can abate more cheaply to mitigate the most. 
The analysis highlights a number of important points for policy makers: 
1. A policy instrument that allows the level of abatement to vary among producers according to 
differences in marginal abatement cost is most cost-effective. The medium goal of 26 kg N 
ha-1 can be achieved at a cost of $15 ha-1 under cap and trade, while a uniform cap on 
emissions for all farmers would be more than three times as expensive ($49 ha-1).  
 
2. Requiring uniform reductions in stocking rate, banning the application of nitrogen fertiliser, 
and land retirement perform poorly, relative to a cap and trade policy. These instruments are 
at least three times more costly than a differentiated policy over all simulated reductions and 
are often many times more expensive. 
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3. All policy instruments have a similar impact on the distribution of farm profit across the 
catchment. Most importantly, the differentiated policy does not greatly alter the distribution 
of farm profit, relative to what exists without regulation. 
 
4. Cost differences between policies are large when extrapolated across the catchment. The 
annual cost of achieving the 26 kg N ha-1 goal with the three most cost-effective instruments 
is predicted to be around $0.6 million with cap and trade, $2 million with a uniform cap on 
N, and $5.1 million with a uniform cap on stocking rate.  
 
5. Mitigation practices are important for reducing abatement cost. However, their optimal use 
varies given heterogeneity between farms. This highlights a key role for economic 
modelling to guide the cost-effective utilisation of abatement activities. 
 Most policy makers in New Zealand and throughout the world have thus far seemed 
reluctant to adopt cap and trade approaches for water quality management. However, the 
capacity of these instruments to account for abatement cost heterogeneity among farms promotes 
their cost-effectiveness, relative to a range of alternative instruments. The magnitude of these 
cost savings, relative to the transaction costs associated with a cap and trade policy, are worthy 
of further research. 
 
Appendix 
Feed supplies are measured using tonnes of dry matter (t DM). The static model describes a 
management year consisting of 26 fortnightly periods ( ]26,...,2,1[=i ), beginning on 1 July. The 
model describes the rotation of a cow herd between multiple paddocks. The area of pasture 
grazed at time t that has not been grazed since period i is represented by GtiA , . Similarly, 
SM
tiA ,  
denotes the area harvested for silage production (i.e. ensiled) at time t that has not been grazed 
since period i. In addition, XtiA ,  represents the area of pasture grazed at time t that was ensiled in 
period i. These three activities collectively describe the rotational land-use system.  
Each producer is assumed to be a profit-maximising agent who owns a farm consisting of a fixed 
area of a  hectares. Total land use at time t is constrained by: 
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The first term on the right hand side describes land use at time t. The second and third terms 
describe land that is rested for future use. 
Grazing ceases at a residual biomass ( tr ) to ensure pasture persistence, improve pasture 
regrowth, and maintain cow intake. Total feed production in period t ( γtP ) for },,{ XSMG=γ is 
represented as: 
∑ ∑
= +=
−+=
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where gb  is pasture biomass growth in period g. Eq. 2 specifies that the total amount of feed 
available at time t, following previous defoliation at time i, consists of the amount of pasture 
remaining after the previous defoliation ( ir ), the amount of pasture remaining after the current 
defoliation ( tr ), and pasture growth between time i and t ( ∑
+=
t
ig
gb
1
).  
The feasibility of production activities defined in eq. A2 is conditioned by the bounds:  
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where minimum biomass levels ( tm ) are maintained to ensure an adequate rate of regrowth and 
maximum biomass levels ( tn ) prevent grazing of grass with low digestibility. 
Pasture supply may be promoted using nitrogen fertiliser. This is described through: 
∑
=
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26
1
,
i
tii
N
t fUP , (A4) 
where NtP  is the pasture biomass (t ha
-1) produced through nitrogen fertilisation in period t, iU  
is the amount of nitrogen fertiliser (t ha-1) applied during period i, and tif ,  is the yield response (t 
DM) in time t following application of one tonne of nitrogen fertiliser in period i. Use of nitrogen 
fertiliser is constrained to represent agronomic and environmental constraints.  
Pasture production may also be increased through the use of nitrification inhibitors—a chemical 
that reduces nitrate and cation leaching by restraining the process of nitrification (Monaghan et 
al., 2007). This is represented through: 
NIaPP t
GNI
t
1−Θ= , (A5) 
 20
where tΘ  is the additional proportion of pasture growth obtained at time t due to the use of 
nitrification inhibitors and NI is the number of hectares on which the inhibitor is applied.  
Metabolisable energy (ME) is that available for livestock growth and maintenance after the 
digestion of feed. The supply of ME for allocation between livestock classes is the sum of all 
feed sources available in a given period. Feed pools supply energy to cows that possess one of 
216 attribute combinations, each with different temporal energy demands driven by disparity in 
calving date, herd status (cull and standard), lactation length, and productivity. Calving begins on 
July 1, July 15, or August 1. Cull cows are milked for 180, 210, 240, 270, or 300 days and are 
then killed. In contrast, standard herds are milked for 240, 270, or 300 days. There are nine levels 
of inherent milk production that reflect genetic diversity. 
The demand and supply of ME is calculated for each fortnightly period through the equation: 
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where hD  represents the number of cows with attribute combination h, the ,  represents the energy 
requirement (measured in MJ of ME per fortnightly period) of a cow with attribute combination 
h at time t, u  represents the proportion of the feed that is consumed by livestock (e.g. Pu  
represents pasture utilisation), q  is the energy content of each feed specified in MJ of 
metabolisable energy (ME) per tonne of DM, SFtP  is the total amount of silage fed to cows 
(compared to SMtP  that is the total amount of grass silage produced), tF  is the amount of maize 
silage (t DM) fed to cows at time t, and tK  is the amount of palm kernel extract (t DM) fed to 
cows at time t.  
It is important that the feed intake of cows is constrained to prevent the herd consuming 
unrealistic amounts of feed. This is represented by: 
KK
t
SF
t
SSSF
t
PNI
t
N
t
X
t
G
t
h
P
th vuKvuFvuPuPPPPvD ++++++≥∑
=
)(
216
1
, (A7) 
where Ptv  is the maximum per cow intake of pasture dry matter at time t (t DM cow
-1), Sv  is the 
substitution rate of pasture to forage supplements (grass and maize silage), and Kv  is the 
substitution rate of pasture to palm kernel extract.  
Total nitrate leaching is defined as: 
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where M is the proportion of nitrate leaching decreased through additional mitigation strategies 
(see eq. A9), χ  is a constant term, hz  is annual milk production (t cow-1) of a cow in herd h, and 
},,,{ υτηφ  are slope coefficients describing the relationship between nitrate leaching and N 
fertiliser application, cow number, milk production, and maize silage feeding, respectively. The 
attenuation factor represents losses of N in the process of transport from field to waterway, due 
to factors such as deep drainage, volatilisation, and plant uptake. The term in square brackets in 
(8) calculates the nitrate leaching arising from relevant decision variables within the model. This 
is modified through the use of CRMPs, described through: 
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where ϑe  for ]5,...,2,1[=ϑ  is the proportional decrease in nitrate leaching achieved with 
mitigation ϑ , 1E  is the extent to which low-rate effluent application is used, 2E  is the extent to 
which dairy shed innovation (i.e. a Dungbuster® system) is used to reduce effluent volumes, 3E  
is the extent to which deferred effluent application is used, and hP  is the number of cows in herd 
h maintained on a self-feeding pad for 10 weeks (70 days) from 21 April to 31 June. The ratios in 
(9) are defined ϑΦ . 
The objective function is: 
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where jπ  is firm profit, milkp  is the price received for milk solids (MS) ($ t-1), hz  is annual milk 
production (t cow-1) of a cow in herd h, cullp  is the price received for one cull cow ($ cow-1), 
calfp  is the price received for one calf ($ calf-1), ψ  is the calving rate, ω  is the replacement rate, 
Dc  is the variable cost associated with a single cow ($ cow-1), Sc  is the cost of conserving grass 
silage ($ t DM-1), Fc  is the cost of maize silage ($ t DM-1), Kc  is the cost of palm kernel extract 
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($ t DM-1), Uc  is the cost of nitrogen fertiliser ($ t-1), FCc  is the fixed cost of production ($ ha-1), 
and ϑc  is the cost of individual CRMPs with full utilisation. 
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